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ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, a number of companies tried and failed to create a
business model built upon editing (or filtering) movies for at-home viewers. Repeatedly, these entities encountered fatal obstacles—legal, business-related, or
otherwise—in their endeavors to do so. Copyright protections proved to be the
most difficult obstacle for these companies, and many filtering businesses infringed upon rights of reproduction, distribution, digital tampering, or first sale.
These conflicts led to numerous litigations and legislative actions, culminating in
the recent Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., a case that still has its effects
playing out in courts and Congress. This article examines the copyright violations
of past filtering endeavors and looks to find viable solutions that avoid the mistakes of the past, fit within copyright statutes, and offer a sustainable business
model. Only by accomplishing all three of these tasks can any filtering service
hope to survive in the future of the filtering market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
December of 1939 proved to be historic for the motion picture industry.1 The
instant classic Gone with the Wind arrived in theaters, grossing almost $200 million domestically.2 In addition to its massive box office success, the film had another impact on the film industry: the Motion Picture Production Code (which
dictated what content was allowed in film) was altered to allow inclusion of Rhett
Butler’s famous line, “Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn.”3 The change created some controversy at the time,4 but the debate that it began continues to this
day.5
Decades later, once at-home viewing was more prevalent for movies, viewers
again raised concerns over particular films’ content.6 With this new controversy,
however, film audiences took matters into their own hands.7 Various businesses
began editing out the vulgar, violent, and sexual content of these films.8 This new
practice brought the wrath of Hollywood down upon these business owners as
litigation mounted and filtering companies were subsequently run out of business.9 Most of these filtering businesses failed due to copyright violations, usually
regarding distribution rights and creations of derivative works.10 What followed
was nearly two decades of trial, error, and failure on the part of hopeful filtering
companies.11 It seems that despite the best efforts of these entrepreneurs, no one
has managed to create a business model that is both effective and legal.12
In spite of these setbacks, filtering services continue to fight for their customers’ right to watch films without content that viewers deem inappropriate.13 These
businesses continue to persist, in part because they believe in a moral right to
viewers’ choice, and in part because there is a profitable market for their ser-

1. Tim Dirks, Timeline of Greatest Film Milestones and Turning Points in Film History: The Year
1939, AMC FILMSITE, http://www.filmsite.org/1939-filmhistory.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
2. Id.; see also Domestic Grosses Adjusted for Ticket Price Inflation, BOX OFF. MOJO,
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (adjusted for inflation, Gone with the Wind grossed nearly $1.873 billion domestically).
3. GONE WITH THE WIND (Selznick International Pictures 1939); Brian Cronin, Did Gone With the
Wind Use the Word “Damn” in Violation of the Motion Picture Association Production Code?, ENT.
URB.
LEGENDS
REVEALED
(Jan.
13,
2013,
4:18
AM),
http://legendsrevealed.com/entertainment/2013/01/13/did-gone-with-the-wind-use-the-word-damn-inviolation-of-the-motion-picture-association-production-code/ (“[I]n November of 1939 . . . the Code
was actually changed!” The words “hell” and “damn” were allowed if they were “essential and required for portrayal, in proper historical context . . . or a quotation from a literary work.”).
4. Id.
5. Jon Cohen, Mixed Reviews for ‘Sanitized’ Movies, ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2005),
https://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/974a1EditingHollywood.pdf.
6. John Hughes, Moviemakers Versus the Clean-flicks Revolt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 28,
2002), https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0828/p09s02-cojh.html.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra Parts II and III.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Braley Dodson, VidAngel CEO Vows to Take Case to Supreme Court, DAILY HERALD (Jan. 6,
2017), https://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/vidangel-ceo-vows-to-take-case-tosupreme-court/article_c82ea477-10c5-5ce4-9e3b-01cd94153126.html.
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vices.14 A poll by ABC News shows that nearly 40% of respondents would be
likely to participate in a filtering service; more than half of those affirmative respondents indicated themselves as “very likely” to participate.15 Accordingly, the
consumer market, in addition to the moral imperative seen by filtering proponents,
drives businesses to continue trying (and failing) to create a service that avoids
copyright violations.16
This article investigates the failures of past models and the potential future of
movie filtering. Particularly, as the world enters an age of digital streaming, there
is more opportunity to create filtering software—legal or otherwise.17 The aim of
this work is to explain the law and analyze failed business models in an effort to
show future enterprises how to succeed in a filtering business. Parts II and III
examine failed filtering businesses, specifically emphasizing where each went
wrong. In Part IV, special attention is given to the most recent and prominent
filtering dispute: the continuing battle between the parties in Disney v. VidAngel.18
Finally, Part V proposes possible solutions to the filtering issue. There are ways in
which a filtering company could operate within existing law; some of which may
be achieved by existing companies, and some of which may require a new entrepreneurial effort. By examining mistakes made in the past, the road to a filtered
future is illuminated.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF FILTERING
Filtering has existed in one iteration or another almost since movies became
available for home viewing.19 Only in the past few decades has editing really taken off, but it has existed in some form since the 1950s.20 A general understanding
of filtering’s history is instructive when considering the current disputes.

A. Early Filtering
In some ways, movie filtering has always been very simple and very legal.
With the creation of the Video Cassette Recorder (“VCR”) in 1956, parents and
families have had the ability to perform two powerful editing functions: fastforwarding and muting. 21 Despite the efficiency of these features, the practical
reality is that such edits are only as effective as the remote-wielder is adept. More
discouraging yet, that remote-wielder is only as adept as he or she is familiar with
the film currently in the VCR. This first form of filtering, while simple, was insufficient for the needs of consumers.

14. About VidAngel, VIDANGEL, https://www.vidangel.com/about [hereinafter About VidAngel] (last
visited Sept. 24, 2018); Cohen, supra note 5.
15. Cohen, supra note 5.
16. Christine McCarroll, Morals, Movies, and the Law: Can Today’s Copyright Protect a Director’s
Masterpiece from Bowdlerization?, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 331, 354–55 (2005).
17. Id. at 341.
18. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part II.
21. Sylvie Castonguay, 50 Years of the Video Cassette Recorder, WIPO MAG. (Nov. 2006),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/06/article_0003.html.
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Formal filtering services first became attractive in the late 1990s.22 As near as
can be determined, the first filtering service primarily dealt in editing VHS copies
of James Cameron’s Titanic.23 This early business consisted of a Utah “mom-andpop video store,” called Sunset Video, which spent its time altering pre-bought
VHS tapes.24 Reportedly, this company only provided the service; clients would
purchase their own copy of Titanic and bring it to the video shop, which would
then snip out the offending frames (Kate Winslet’s brief nudity) from the tape and
return it to the client.25 It began as a small, local service, but soon grew rapidly.26
Some reports indicated that the shop edited over 10,000 copies of the film.27 The
service did not last long, but it made the public aware of a consumer preference
that was thus far untapped.28 More expansive editing operations began to emerge
within the next few years.29

B. Airplanes and Television
It is worth noting that edited, derivative copies of films already exist in multiple mediums. 30 For years, some television stations, and more notably, airlines,
have shown edited versions of film and television productions.31 There is often a
public sentiment that these edits are too sensitive and leave too much out, sometimes sacrificing a cohesive plot.32 However, this particular practice plays no role
in the current discussion. Edited films shown on airplanes and television are specially contracted versions, created by the studio and film distributors themselves.33
In accordance with specific agreements, these film studios create finished, edited
versions and distribute them exclusively to their contractual partners.34 Copies of

22. Hughes, supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.; Michael P. Glasser, Note, “To Clean or Not to Clean”: An Analysis of the Copyright and
Trademark Issues Surrounding the Legal Battle Between Third Party Film Editors and the Film Industry, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 129, 133 n.23 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Dan Kadison, H’wood: Don’t Cut – Lawsuit Could Kill Companies Selling Cleaned-up Films,
N.Y. POST (Sept. 23, 2002, 4:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2002/09/23/hwood-dont-cut-lawsuit-couldkill-companies-selling-cleaned-up-films/.
28. Glasser, supra note 24, at 134–35.
29. Id. at 135.
30. See William Hughes, Sony to Release “Clean” Versions of its Movies for Digital Download, AV
NEWS (June 6, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://news.avclub.com/sony-to-release-clean-versions-of-its-moviesfor-digi-1798262649.
31. Anthony Grant, [Bleep!] How Airlines Censor In-Flight Entertainment, POINTS GUY (Aug. 19,
2018), https://thepointsguy.com/news/bleep-how-airlines-censor-in-flight-entertainment/.
32. Dave Roos, What Gets Left In, Out on In-Flight Movies Nowadays?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Oct. 6,
2017),
https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/what-gets-left-in-out-on-in-flight-moviesnowadays.htm; see Jake Rossen, When Monty Python Took American Television to Court, MENTAL
FLOSS (June 6, 2017), http://mentalfloss.com/article/501461/when-monty-python-took-americantelevision-court (television network ABC aired six episodes of Monty Python’s Flying Circus, but
edited the episodes for its audiences. The resulting edits were 22 minutes shorter than the original
episodes, and the debacle ended in a lawsuit); see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1976).
33. Grant, supra note 31.
34. Id.; see also Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. D.
Ct. 2006).
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these studio edits are unavailable elsewhere in the market, though this may change
to some degree in the future.35

III. PROBLEMS OF THE PAST: WHY FILTERING’S HISTORY IS FILLED
WITH FAILURE
There is an adage that extolls the virtue of learning from watching others
make mistakes: “Fools pretend that you can only gain experience at your own
expense, but I always managed to learn at the expense of others.”36 Any effort to
create a legal and effective business model for filtering will surely be futile without a consultation of the mistakes past companies made. There are many useful
examples to demonstrate what models do not work and what actions violate copyright laws.37

A. CleanFlicks
One of the earliest businesses to make an attempt at profitable filtering was
CleanFlicks.38 Even though studios produced edited copies of their films,39 these
edits were not available to the consumer market at large.40 CleanFlicks’s founder,
Ray Lines, decided to extend clean films to the everyday consumer when he saw
the opportunity.41
Lines initially began by simply performing an editing service for himself and
his friends.42 Using his own editing gear, he would alter or make imperceptible
bits of video or audio that he deemed inappropriate.43 His practice gained more
attention from friends, and he soon branched out by making use of the internet to
create a nationwide rental and editing service.44 In addition to copying, renting,
and selling edited DVDs, CleanFlicks also functioned as an editor for discs already owned by viewers; customers could mail their own copy to CleanFlicks to
be edited and returned.45
The process of editing DVDs is more complex than the simple snipping procedure Sunset Video performed on VHS tapes.46 The editors must first upload the
entirety of the film into a digital format, a process which requires circumventing
protective technologies embedded in the disc.47 Once the film is on the computer,
35. Hughes, supra note 30.
36. BISMARCK INTIME: THE IRON CHANCELLOR IN PRIVATE LIFE 180 (Henry Hayward trans., D.
Appleton & Co. 1890).
37. See infra Parts III and IV.
38. Glasser, supra note 24, at 130 n.11 (listing a number of other early services contemporary to
CleanFlicks).
39. Roos, supra note 32.
40. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. D. Ct. 2006).
41. Glasser, supra note 24, at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 134–35 (CleanFlicks anticipated nearly $2 million in revenue for the 2002 fiscal year).
45. Id. at 135 (this early business model was similar to the one Netflix used in its early business
years).
46. See Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. D. Ct. 2006).
47. Id. (the District Court of Colorado described these protections as “a digital content scrambling
protection system . . . designed to prevent copying.”).
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editors use standard editing software to omit visual or audio selections.48 When
this entire editing process is complete, the film is exported as a single file which is
then used to burn multiple discs for rental or sale.49
Shortly after CleanFlicks (and other companies like it) began to garner a profitable business, the Director’s Guild of America (“DGA”) and a number of other
parties threatened to bring suit to bar these editing businesses. 50 CleanFlicks
joined with its associate companies and preemptively initiated an action seeking a
declaratory judgment vindicating their activity and pronouncing them free of copyright violation.51 The DGA and its allies brought a counterclaim against the filtering companies alleging copyright violations and asserting rights of reproduction, distribution, and creation of derivative works.52 These are the very first three
rights guaranteed exclusively to copyright holders.53 The sections below examine
the DGA’s claim against CleanFlicks with respect to each right in turn.
The first exclusive right the studios sought to protect was the right of reproduction.54 U.S. copyright law is very clear in its language: “the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords.”55 A “copy” under copyright law is any “material object[]
. . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed.”56 The
DGA’s rights were clear, and CleanFlicks was in violation of those rights, as the
very nature of its business was to create and copy edited versions of feature
films.57 The court granted summary judgment on this first count to the DGA.58
The second claim asserted that CleanFlicks’s edits were derivative works,
which are prohibited by copyright protections.59 Derivative works are a very broad
category of works that essentially include any form in which a work may be “recast, transformed, or adapted.”60 The court’s decision in this case hinged on the
meaning of the word “transformative.”61 The Supreme Court has provided guidance for this definition; in 1994, a work was deemed transformative if it “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.”62 With this standard in mind, the District
Court of Colorado concluded that the CleanFlicks edits did not add anything new
by way of content or message.63 Because CleanFlicks’s work was not transformative, summary judgment on count two was denied to the DGA.64
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Glasser, supra note 24, at 139.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 141; Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2002).
54. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
57. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
58. Id. at 1243.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (the statute sets forth a lengthy list of possible formats of derivative works,
which includes the following: “translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”).
61. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
62. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
63. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
64. Id. at 1243.
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Third, the studios claimed that CleanFlicks violated its exclusive rights to distribution.65 The fact that the filtering businesses sold and rented edited copies of
films is undisputed.66 Here, CleanFlicks asserted a defense by way of the first sale
doctrine.67 The first sale doctrine effectively says that purchasers of an authorized
copy of a work have the right to do with it what they please; in other words, it
immunizes consumers from liability for resale (which would otherwise violate the
right of distribution).68 However, this doctrine does not extend so far as to overcome the exclusive right to reproduction.69 Had CleanFlicks altered their original,
authorized copies, the first sale doctrine might have protected them, but by making multiple of their own copies, they were then distributing unauthorized works.70
Summary judgment on this third count was granted in favor of the DGA.71
In summation, CleanFlicks was held to not violate the exclusive right to create derivative works.72 However, as it interfered with rights to reproduction and
distribution, it was held to be in violation of existing copyright law.73 The District
Court of Colorado ordered a permanent injunction, barring CleanFlicks and its
associates from continuing their business endeavors.74

B. ClearPlay
The next notable attempt at filtering was the ClearPlay DVD player.75 This
new startup actually sold entire DVD players, not just the DVDs.76 These players
came with a FilterStick (essentially a glorified USB with the ClearPlay logo),
which plugged into a computer to download filters from the ClearPlay website.77
Once those filters were downloaded, the FilterStick went into the DVD player
along with any authorized DVD purchased or rented from an authorized dealer.78
With everything in place, the player then edited the authorized copy of the movie
as it played, cutting audio or omitting segments with inappropriate content.79

65. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002).
66. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
67. Id. at 1242.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).
69. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242; Glasser, supra note 24, at 147.
70. Glasser, supra note 24, at 146. (it should be noted, however, that 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) may
have still rendered CleanFlicks’s business unlawful. Under this statute, otherwise lawful distribution is
unlawful if it is “for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage . . . by rental, lease, or
lending.”).
71. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1243–44.
75. Sean Portnoy, Self-Censoring Upconverting DVD Player Filters Inappropriate Content, ZDNET
(Nov. 30, 2009, 10:35 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/self-censoring-upconverting-dvd-playerfilters-inappropriate-content/.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see ClearPlay Blu-ray and DVD Player, CLEARPLAY, https://try.clearplay.com/blu-rayplayer/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (the newer DVD players are equipped with Blu-ray capability and
come with Wi-Fi that eliminates the need for FilterSticks.).
78. McCarroll, supra note 16, at 347.
79. Id.
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There were some questions regarding ClearPlay’s legality, and it was even
included in the initial litigation against CleanFlicks. 80 The studios prepared to
bring the same claims against ClearPlay with particular emphasis on the derivative
works claim.81 However, concerted legislative and lobbying efforts led to an intermediary result that changed the course of the pending lawsuit.82

C. Enter: The Family Movie Act of 2005
In 2005, Congress intervened, cutting some of the filtering litigation short and
resolving a number of questions before they were fully vetted by the courts.83 The
Family Movie Act of 2005 (“FMA”) adjusted copyright law to allow limited exceptions in which some filtering companies could exist.84 After becoming law on
April 27, 2005, this act was codified in 17 U.S.C. § 110 as an exemption from the
copyright holder’s exclusive rights.85
Specifically, the FMA created a narrow exemption for technology designed to
help edit authorized copies of films:
[T]he following [is] not infringement[] of copyright . . . the making imperceptible . . . of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion
picture . . . or the creation or provision of a computer program or other
technology that enables such making imperceptible . . . if no fixed copy
of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer
program or other technology.86
In other words, the FMA made it legal for a company (like ClearPlay, but not
CleanFlicks) to provide technology or software to edit movies on behalf of private
home viewers.87 It did not, however, allow for fixed or permanent copies of the
edit to be made, much less reproduced and distributed.88
Once the FMA passed, ClearPlay, CleanFlicks, and the remaining filtering
businesses were once again examined by the courts.89 ClearPlay and another company, Family Shield, were severed from the action, but all accompanying claims
were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.90 The court held that “Congress has made
a policy decision that those who provide the technology to enable viewers to edit
80. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1 (Colo. D. Ct.
Aug. 17, 2005).
81. McCarroll, supra note 16, at 352–53 (interestingly, this derivative works claim was the one that
failed against CleanFlicks. There may be a possibility that ClearPlay would have been excluded from
the permanent injunction pronounced upon the other filtering businesses.).
82. Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1.
83. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); Clean
Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (Colo. D. Ct. 2006).
84. Family Movie Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. tit. 2 (2005) (enacted).
85. Family Movie Act of 2005, 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (“[T]he amendment was not intended to exempt
actions resulting in fixed copies of altered works.”).
89. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1 (Colo. D. Ct.
Aug. 17, 2005).
90. Id. (“The technology provided by Family Shield and ClearPlay is consistent with the statutory
definition.”).
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films for their private viewing should not be liable to the copyright owners for
infringing their copyright protections . . . and that removes this court’s jurisdiction
over any further controversy.”91 CleanFlicks and its associates, however, were not
so lucky.92 The remaining filtering companies continued their litigation, proceeding with the case described above.93
ClearPlay’s vindication has been thorough and powerful. 94 Because
ClearPlay’s DVD players allow customers to use authorized copies of films, the
business is not making fixed copies, nor is it reproducing or distributing existing
copies. 95 In fact, in subsequent legal battles over filtering, ClearPlay has been
lauded as a viable, legal option for providing an effective service.96
Despite ClearPlay’s legal vindication, the company has floundered by some
reports.97 As the world transitioned from physical discs to streaming, ClearPlay
made a somewhat slow and ineffective conversion.98 Aside from its Blu-ray/DVD
players (which some argue are quickly becoming obsolete technologies), 99
ClearPlay only managed to make the jump to compatibility with a single streaming service: Google Play.100 Even this service has recently encountered trouble
keeping up with the advances in streaming software. 101 In September 2016,
Google altered some of its coding, which interfered with ClearPlay’s ability to
filter new releases after that time.102 Some advocates of filtering even had suspicions that this code alteration was intentionally aimed at blocking ClearPlay’s
service. 103 Despite the legality of ClearPlay’s filtering services, it has failed to
develop a successful, long-term business model.

IV. CURRENT DISPUTES
Clearplay’s failure to provide a reliable filtering option left consumers searching for a solution.104 Recently, however, another determined and public effort has
91. Id. at *2.
92. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (“[T]he appropriate branch of government had
the opportunity to make the policy choice now urged and rejected it.”).
93. Id.; see also supra Part III.A.
94. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
95. Id.
96. Id. (“An injunction in this case would not prevent . . . a filtering service similar to ClearPlay’s,
and thus wouldn’t negatively impact the public interest in watching filtered content in private.”).
97. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5, Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-56843), 2017 WL 774224.
98. Brief of Amicus Curiae Clearplay, Inc. Supporting Plaintiffs/Appellees at 14, Disney Enters.,
869 F.3d 848 (No. 16-56843), 2017 WL 696293 [hereinafter Clearplay Amicus Brief].
99. Jess Bolluyt, Are Blu-Ray and DVD Players Already Obsolete?, CHEATSHEET (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.cheatsheet.com/gear-style/blu-ray-dvd-players-already-obsolete.html/.
100. Clearplay Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at *14.
101. Gene Maddaus, ClearPlay is No Longer Offering Filtered Movies to Stream, VARIETY (Feb. 7,
2017,
3:02
PM),
https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/clearplay-streaming-new-releases-googleshutdown-1201980650/.
102. Michael Cieply, ClarPlay Confirms it Can No Longer Stream New Filtered Movies through
Google, as Competing VidAngel Fights Injunction, DEADLINE (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:49 PM),
https://deadline.com/2017/02/clearplay-confirms-cant-stream-new-filtered-films-through-google1201904160/.
103. Id.; see also Jeffrey Harmon, ClearPlay Streaming Has Secretly Been Shut Down Since September, VIDANGEL (Feb. 7, 2017), https://blog.vidangel.com/2017/02/07/breaking-clearplay-streaminghas-secretly-been-shut-down-since-september/.
104. See Cohen, supra note 5.
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been made to secure rights to filter movies.105 Perhaps there has been no effort so
concerted as VidAngel to provide a lasting and legal filtering service, particularly
for the streaming platform.106

A. The Rise of VidAngel
Initially, VidAngel attempted two unsuccessful business models for filtering.107 After these failed efforts, the company settled on its primary business model (which became the model disputed in VidAngel’s legal proceedings).108 This
new and inventive model allowed VidAngel to filter and stream movies and television shows to users on a great number of devices.109 However, the process was
also complex and onerous.
For every movie that VidAngel wished to stream, the company first purchased “multiple” copies of DVD and Blu-ray discs for the respective title.110 To
keep track of each disc in supply, VidAngel assigned each a unique barcode.111
The majority of the discs were stored in a central vault for safekeeping, but one
DVD copy and one Blu-ray copy were ripped and uploaded to a server as the
“master files.”112 The creation of this master file required that VidAngel bypass
digital encryptions and security measures encoded into the disc, which are commonly referred to as Technological Protection Measures (“TPMs”).113 Once this
ripped master file was safely on VidAngel’s server, the film was marked in segments and tagged for various types of inappropriate content. 114 These markers
formed the basis of the filtering service.
The home viewer would select a film from VidAngel’s library, which they
then purchased for $20.115 VidAngel’s business model asserted that when a customer paid this $20, they purchased one of the uniquely coded discs in the
VidAngel vault.116 After purchasing a disc, the customer identified which content
they did not wish to see, and VidAngel removed segments with those corresponding markers before streaming the remaining film to the viewer’s device.117 The
105. See Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
106. Id. at 852.
107. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10–11, Disney Enters., 869 F.3d 848 (No. 16-56843), 2017 WL
412299 [hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief] (the first of these models worked through Google’s
Chromecast. The second was a free service through YouTube. Both needed studio permission to continue, and the studios withheld consent on both accounts).
108. Id. at *11.
109. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 854 (supported devices included “Roku, Apple TV, Smart TV,
Amazon Fire TV, Android, Chromecast, iPad/iPhone and desktop or laptop computers.”).
110. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *11–12; Appellees’ Answering Brief at 7, Disney
Enters., 869 F.3d 848 (No. 16-56843) 2017 WL 658694 [hereinafter Appellees’ Answering Brief];
Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853 (no official number is placed on the supply of discs VidAngel acquired. All three sources cited use the word “multiple,” and VidAngel—the appellant—later uses the
word “many.” VidAngel also specifies in its opening brief that it spends almost a third of its capital on
discs, which totaled in over $1.2 million of disc purchases by late 2016. In reality, the supply of each
title likely varied based on projected demand.).
111. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *12.
112. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *12.
117. Id. (noting that no fixed copy of the edited film is created or saved in VidAngel’s model).
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court points out, and it is worth noting, that the stream from VidAngel originated
from the original master file and not the actual disc “purchased” by the customer.118
After viewing the edited film, the VidAngel customer had the option (and was
indeed encouraged) to sell back the “disc” they purchased for its purchase price
less $1 for each day the customer had the disc “in their possession.”119 This sellback model effectively amounted to a $1 per day rental service.120 In fact, the
court aptly pointed out that VidAngel advertised itself as such a rental service.121
In this process, the disc that has technically changed ownership multiple times
had, in actuality, remained safely in VidAngel’s vault for the duration of the
transactions.122
After implementing this new filtering system, VidAngel grew quickly.123 The
accessibility of the service on multiple devices, combined with an aggressive marketing campaign, led to a large influx of customers.124 Soon, VidAngel boasted
over 100,000 monthly users.125 Unfortunately for VidAngel, however, its quick
success would only last so long.

B. A Fallen VidAngel
In June of 2016, a number of film studios brought an action seeking to enjoin
VidAngel’s streaming and filtering service. 126 In their complaints, the studios
raised a number of exclusive rights violations, citing many of the same offenses
CleanFlicks had committed a decade or so earlier.127 Additionally, Disney and its
associates asserted a claim for redress based on VidAngel’s circumvention of
TPMs.128
That December, a district court in California held that Disney was likely to
succeed on its claims and it imposed a preliminary injunction against VidAngel.129
VidAngel’s filtering and streaming service was prohibited from engaging in the
essential activities of its business and was therefore effectively brought to a
screeching halt in its quest to filter movies for viewers.130
Seeking redress from this initial injunction, VidAngel appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.131 In August 2017, eight months after the initial injunction, VidAngel was

118. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 854.
119. Id. (i.e., if a customer sold a film back to VidAngel immediately after purchasing and viewing it,
the sellback price would be $19. If the customer waited until the next day, they would receive $18.).
120. Id. (VidAngel’s rate increases to $2 per day for high-definition titles.).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 853.
123. Id. at 855.
124. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *10.
125. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 855.
126. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (listing as plaintiffs
a number of notable movie-making parties, including Disney, Lucasfilm, Twentieth Century Fox, and
Warner Bros).
127. Id. at 969–71; Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (Colo. D.
Ct. 2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
128. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 967; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
129. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974.
130. Id. at 979.
131. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
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dealt another blow as the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.132 With
the injunction still in place, the case returned to the district court, where in March
of 2019, summary judgment was granted for the studios.133 In June of 2019, the
case will be heard before a jury that will make a decision on the damages VidAngel owes.134

C. What Went Wrong?
In its affirmation of the injunction against VidAngel, the Ninth Circuit spent
much of its time discussing its standard of review and VidAngel’s defenses,135 but
its opinion (and the opinion of the Central District of California) indicated that
there were five main issues.136 To adequately conceive of a legal model for filtering, each of these issues is addressed and analyzed below.

i. Illegal Circumvention of TPMs
In order for VidAngel to rip the content off of its purchased discs and onto its
server, it necessarily had to overcome a series of TPMs that the studios and distributors placed on the discs to protect the works contained therein.137 VidAngel
readily admitted to this circumvention, referring to it in a more ameliorative light
as “decrypting” and asserting that, as the rightful owner of the disc, VidAngel had
the right to do so under the fair use doctrine.138 The assertion that VidAngel circumvented TPMs was a serious accusation, and it played a large part in CleanFlicks’s loss in court.139
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) provides copyright holders with a number of specific provisions that protect their works in the
increasingly technological world. 140 In a very literal way, the DMCA brought
copyright law into the twenty-first century. Among the protections enacted are a
number of “criminal penalties for circumvention of copyright protection systems”141 such as the TPMs involved in the discs that store these films.142 However,
VidAngel continued to lean on its fair use defense to combat these allegations
under the DMCA.143
The court held that VidAngel’s fair use defense was unsupported by facts or
law.144 The fair use doctrine codified in the copyright statute exempts certain ac132. Id. at 867.
133. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., No. CV 16-04109 AB (PLAx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2019), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5762185-VidAngel.html.
134. Neal Harmon, VidAngel CEO Neal Harmon: Copyright Infringement Ruling, and Where We Go
from Here, VIDANGEL (Mar. 8, 2019), http://blog.vidangel.com/2019/03/08/vidangel-ceo-nealharmon-copyright-infringement-ruling-and-where-we-go-from-here/.
135. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d 848.
136. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
137. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853.
138. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *20, 32; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
139. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (2006).
140. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
141. Yushan Luo, Intellectual Property Crimes, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1399, 1426 (2018).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
143. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *20, 32.
144. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017).
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tivities from copyright violation, including reproduction and other protections for
particular purposes.145 Fair use protects such exemptions “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”146 In
the statute, courts are instructed to consider factors such as the nature and purpose
of the fair use, the amount of the original work used, and the effect of the use on
the source material.147 VidAngel argued that its actions were exempted as a simple
“space-shift” (or transition between formats). 148 This strategy proved futile, as
there is established precedent holding that space-shifting is only fair use when it is
for the owner of the work alone and not the general public.149 Because VidAngel
distributed its space-shifted copies, the fair use doctrine did not protect its business practice.150
After the fair use defense failed, there was little to protect VidAngel under the
DMCA. Circumventing a TPM is a clear violation of copyright law.151 Because
VidAngel was decrypting discs for use in a commercial business, its practice of
overcoming TPMs was unjustified under the DMCA’s copyright protections.

ii. Unauthorized Reproduction and Distribution of Copyrighted Works
The most obvious violation by VidAngel was the outright infringement of
two of the primary rights protected by copyright statutes.152 The law clearly states
that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . [and] to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work. . . .”153
VidAngel is without valid defense for these offenses.
VidAngel admitted that one of its business practices was to copy the contents
of the disc to the company’s server, a practice with precedential illegality established over 25 years.154 By using its computers to store and edit films, VidAngel
violated the studios’ first-listed exclusive right under current copyright law.155
The court spent little time discussing the studios’ exclusive right to distribution.156 The very purpose of VidAngel’s business was to distribute and provide
access to filtered movies.157 Because of the clear copyright issues in this regard,
the courts had little need to belabor the point.

145. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *16.
149. A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
150. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1999) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
153. Id.
154. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853; see also MAI Sys. Corp., v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
518 (9th Cir. 1993).
155. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
156. See Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
157. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *1.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

13

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23

166

B.E.T.R.

[Vol. 3 2019

iii. Abuse of the First Sale Doctrine
What little discussion the court gave regarding distribution centered on deprivation of profits and financial harm to the studios.158 Part of this discussion of
harm particularly emphasized the profits VidAngel was claiming in a manner
adverse to the studios.159 Streaming, as it turns out, is a large source of income
that the studios rely on.160 By illegally laying claim to a significant corner of the
streaming market, VidAngel encroached on profits that, under proper licensing,
rightfully belonged to the studios.161
Simple arithmetic characterizes the degree to which VidAngel’s efforts
usurped business from the studios. On average, any one of VidAngel’s discs was
“rented”—bought and resold—16 times in the first month of streaming through
the platform, all the while remaining safely locked in the VidAngel vault.162 This
means that, for every copy of the disc VidAngel purchased, the studios lost many
times over the revenue it would have generated had each of those sales been
through a licensed seller. This statistic only accounts for the first four weeks as
well; sales likely continued to amass even after the end of this measurement. If
VidAngel spent millions of dollars buying discs,163 that means that the studios lost
millions more as a result—$15 million or more in the first month alone for every
million VidAngel spent.164 Furthermore, the court noted that almost half of users
would view the same titles even without filtering.165 This fact demonstrates that,
contrary to VidAngel’s assertions, its service does not benefit the studios by “expand[ing] their market.”166
In defending this point, VidAngel cited other rental companies, both old
(Blockbuster) and new (Redbox).167 VidAngel argued that it had a right to engage
in the rental business just as those other companies did.168 In return, the studios
argued that VidAngel’s own behavior differentiated itself from these lawful rental
companies, which relied on the first sale doctrine.169 VidAngel’s mistake in this
analogy was twofold: (1) the first sale doctrine does not apply to works that are

158. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974–77; Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 865–66.
159. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853.
160. Id.
161. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
162. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *8.
163. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *17.
164. A loss of “$15 million or more” is calculated using a simple multiplier of the first-month average
sales. For example, assume that the average DVD price is $20 (though the math is the same for any
value). $1,000,000 ÷ $20 per copy = 50,000 copies; 50,000 copies × 16 uses in the first month =
800,000 copies the studio might have sold; 800,000 × $20 per copy = $16,000,000 the studios will
never see. Subtract the $1 million VidAngel initially invested to see that the studio loss is estimated at
$15 million. Note, too, that this value estimates the loss attributed to the studios. At $1 per rental,
VidAngel only makes $800,000 for every $15 million it causes the studios to lose.
165. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 861; Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *46.
166. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *2–3 (note, too, that even if VidAngel’s service
expanded the studios’ market, the profits of that expansion fill the bank account of VidAngel, not the
studios.).
167. Id. at *19.
168. Id. at *18.
169. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *23–24.
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unlawfully made or reproduced,170 and (2) copyright laws do not protect rental
companies under the fair use doctrine unless authorized by the owners of the copyright.171 VidAngel was not authorized to rent films, nor was it distributing lawfully made copies of the works in question.172 VidAngel’s own business model, in
resorting to its buy/sell-back system, evinces that even its own administrators
doubted the legality of their business practices.173 Otherwise, they would have had
little reason to resort to such a technical and nuanced “rental” plan.174

iv. Preemptive Release in Restricted Format/Interruption
of Windowing Strategy
The court’s discussion of harm inflicted by VidAngel’s business continued on
to a new practice known to the studios as “windowing.”175 Windowing is the strategy by which studios “strategically release their content across different distribution channels and to different licensees over time.” 176 Typically, a windowing
strategy will gradually move from an initial release in disc or digital format to a
wider viewing availability over streaming or broadcast networks.177
VidAngel’s business interrupted this windowing practice by making works
available for streaming during times of exclusive licensing or disc release.178 The
court identified a couple of examples: Star Wars: The Force Awakens was available for streaming on VidAngel before licensed streaming began, and The Martian
could be streamed during an exclusive license the studios had granted to HBO.179
These interferences by VidAngel constituted unlawful distribution of films in
restricted formats at a time when such formats were legally unavailable.180 In this
light, VidAngel’s business resembles piracy, something to which the Ninth Circuit
softly alluded.181

v. Failure to Filter Authorized Copies
VidAngel’s strongest defense against these copyright claims was that its
business was protected by the FMA.182 Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the
170. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008) (granting fair use exemptions to “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title” (emphasis added)).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A).
172. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017).
173. See Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *9 (VidAngel’s CEO “called buy-sell back
the most creative way VidAngel could come up with to offer an on-demand streaming service while
trying to stay buttoned up legally . . . . In less euphemistic terms, buy-sellback is a lawyer-created
construct that VidAngel uses to stream performances while feigning its customers own Discs.” (internal quotations omitted)).
174. Id. at *8, 11 (the studios declared this model a “sham,” and quoted both customers and VidAngel’s own marketing campaign, both of which described the service as a rental platform.).
175. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
176. Id.
177. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853.
178. Id. at 866.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 859.
182. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *19.
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authors of the FMA agreed.183 Senator Orrin Hatch, the sponsor of the FMA, stated that he intended the FMA to be construed narrowly.184 He set out to protect a
very specific filtering model, and, unfortunately for VidAngel, that model belonged to ClearPlay.185 ClearPlay, in fact, roundly condemned VidAngel’s model
as contravening the purpose of the FMA.186
The FMA exempted from copyright the elimination of audio or video content
for in-home viewing (or technology that accomplished this end), so long as the
processes created no fixed version of the altered film.187 VidAngel purported to
comply with all of these conditions,188 but even if it did, nothing in the FMA allowed filtering companies exemptions from other exclusive rights belonging to the
copyright holders.189
The simplest explanation of the court’s decision is that the FMA allows for
filtering of authorized copies of a film, and VidAngel’s copies were unauthorized.190 Starting with an authorized copy did not necessarily mean that VidAngel
actually streamed an authorized copy.191 Because it was streaming an unauthorized copy, VidAngel’s act of “making imperceptible” portions of films was not
protected by the FMA.

V. THE FUTURE OF FILTERING
The future of movie filtering is now anyone’s game. The playing field is set,
but no single business has truly laid claim to the market yet. Naturally, any filtering hopefuls will need to fit within the copyright laws already discussed, but there
are a number of viable options for future filtering companies.

A. VidAngel’s New System: Will it be Enough?
While litigation was still pending in the Ninth Circuit, VidAngel began implementing a survival strategy as it continued its attempts to find a legal model for
filtering.192 In preparation for the worst, VidAngel filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, even as it launched its new filtering system.193 With that legal safety

183. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 860.
184. Id. at 859.
185. Id. at 860.
186. Clearplay Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at *5.
187. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005).
188. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *19.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (stating that “[n]othing in paragraph (11) shall be construed to imply further
rights under section 106 of this title”); see also Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957,
968 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“[T]he FMA does not provide any exemption from the anti-circumvention
provisions of [§] 1201 of title 17.” Recall that § 1201 prohibited circumvention of TPMs under the
DMCA. (internal quotations omitted)).
190. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 860.
191. See supra Parts IV.A, C.
192. Gene Maddaus, VidAngel Changes Course with New Netflix and Amazon Filtering Service,
VARIETY (June 13, 2017, 6:31 PM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/vidangel-netflix-amazonfiltering-launch-1202464295/.
193. Gene Maddaus, VidAngel Declares Bankruptcy to Put Copyright Fight on Hold, VARIETY (Oct.
18, 2017, 3:14 PM), https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/vidangel-bankruptcy-1202593659/.
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net in place, VidAngel felt confident as it rolled out what it hoped would be the
future of its business.194
The new VidAngel model looks very different from the one the courts
banned.195 As it restructured its service, VidAngel attempted to solve each problem the studios and the courts found with its initial model.196 Now, it seeks validation that its new structure is legal.197
With this new system, users pay a monthly fee of $9.99 to subscribe to the
VidAngel service.198 After that, users must also sign into a separately owned account for either Amazon or Netflix streaming services.199 With both subscriptions
in place, the user can select any title available over either platform.200 To do so,
viewers use the VidAngel app, which then communicates with the outside streaming services.201 At that point, VidAngel serves as a middleman, intercepting the
stream from the valid account and removing the undesired content for the viewer
at home.202 By applying the filter over the top of a licensed stream, VidAngel
hopes that this new service will be deemed valid.203
As of early 2019, courts have declined to take official action in regards to the
new model. 204 VidAngel petitioned the California District Court in September
2017 to clarify that the new service was not included in the injunction.205 The
court denied the motion for clarification, saying only that the injunction was to
stop engaging in practices which interfere with the studio’s copyrights.206 However, in nearly two years since the launch of VidAngel’s new service, neither the
court nor the studios have taken any action against VidAngel.207 This tolerance
stands in marked contrast to the court’s swift reaction to VidAngel’s continued
service after the original injunction.208 Two weeks after implementing the injunction, VidAngel was held in contempt and fined $10,000 for failing to cease operations of its original service.209
Notable also in the continuing VidAngel saga is a proposed amendment to the
FMA, which was introduced to the House of Representatives on September 13,

194. Id.
195. Maddaus, supra note 192.
196. Facts Concerning VidAngel’s New Filtering Technology, VIDANGEL 2 (June 2017),
http://blog.vidangel.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fact-Sheet-VidAngels-New-Technology.pdf
[hereinafter VIDANGEL] (pointing out the decryption, the buy-sell-back model, the windowing concerns, and the exclusivity of other licenses).
197. Id.
198. Maddaus, supra note 192.
199. Id.
200. VIDANGEL, supra note 196, at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., No. CV 16-04109-AB (PLAx), 2017 WL 6820015, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 2017).
205. Id.
206. Id. at *2.
207. Ashley Cullins, VidAngel Asks Court to Revisit Pause on its Service, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 14,
2019, 12:34 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/vidangel-asks-court-revisit-pauseservice-1175880 (mentioning that the studios have threatened to seek contempt, which means they
have not done so).
208. Maddaus, supra note 192.
209. Id.
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2018. 210 The proposed amendment makes little substantive change to existing
copyright law, but VidAngel’s legislative advocates hope it will clarify existing
law and protect its business.211 Notable portions read as follows:
[Adding to the list of exemptions:] the making imperceptible by or at the
direction of an individual, acting in a personal capacity, of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance
transmitted to that individual for private viewing, directly or indirectly
from an authorized copy or digital transmission of the motion picture, or
the provision of a service that enables such . . . [Then, clarifying that new
paragraph:] (A) no person asserting the rights of a motion picture copyright owner may prevent or impede by contract the provision of a service
as described . . . (B) no person providing an authorized digital transmission of a motion picture for any individual may modify technical aspects
of its transmission service for the purpose of preventing such individual
from receiving a transmission. . . .212
Essentially, this new amendment would create three notable additions to copyright law: (1) it specifically states that a company could lawfully provide a service to omit portions of films within homes, (2) it prohibits copyright holders from
taking any action to impede such companies, and (3) it prohibits authorized
streaming services from interfering with such companies by altering technical
specifications.213
While these amendments and additions seem facially cosmetic, VidAngel
hopes that they will be enough to clarify the validity of movie filtering in the national statute.214 This new bill would not protect VidAngel’s old system or help to
overturn the injunction,215 but it may insulate the new model from further litigation. Notable, too, is the prohibition of licensed distributors from altering code or
other technical aspects in order to block filtering companies.216 This inclusion is
likely to prevent software filtering barriers such as the ones encountered by
ClearPlay.217
In the end, VidAngel may not even survive long enough for a final determination concerning this new technology. By filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, it has indicated that there is at least a possibility that the fight for filtering
may not go well.218 And, thus far, it has not; VidAngel’s bankruptcy protection

210. Family Movie Act Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6816, 115th Cong. (2018) (note that this
iteration of the FMA Clarification Act failed to pass). See infra Part V.B.
211. See Neal Harmon, We Have a Bill! (H.R. 6816), VIDANGEL (Sept. 27, 2018),
http://blog.vidangel.com/2018/09/27/bill-h-r-6816/.
212. H.R. 6816.
213. Id.
214. Tell Your Member to Co-Sponsor H.R. 6816, VIDANGEL, http://savefiltering.vidangel.com/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2019).
215. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., No. CV 16-04109 AB (PLAx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2019), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5762185-VidAngel.html.
216. H.R. 6816 § 2(a)(5)(B).
217. See supra notes 98–102.
218. VidAngel Uses Bankruptcy Strategy to Fend Off Studios, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2017, 8:52 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2017/10/18/vidangel-uses-bankruptcy-strategy-tofend-off-studios/#6678f4da4cee.
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was not enough to halt the pending litigation against it.219 Without that protection,
VidAngel was found liable for copyright violation, and will face a jury trial in the
summer of 2019 to determine damages.220 Regardless of the impending outcome,
however, VidAngel has at least shed considerable light on some of the rights and
wrongs of movie filtering, and maybe helped pioneer a legal path along its way.

B. Is There a Possible Solution?
Considering the legal battles of the past and present and the continued conflict of the last two decades, there are clearly a number of improper and unlawful
ways to edit films. The questions remaining are whether there is a legal way to do
so and, if there is, what that method looks like. Moving forward, there are four
possible solutions for home viewers interested in filtering movies.
The first—and possibly most obvious—solution is both simple and efficient:
companies could simply stop trying to filter movies. This option, for whatever
level of confrontation it avoids, is probably the least likely to occur. The public
demonstrated that they have some level of interest in filtering services, and companies like VidAngel are dedicated to offering that service.221 With the obvious
out of the way, there remain three more likely possibilities.
Studios do have the option of releasing the edited films they make for airlines
and television stations.222 These copies already exist and are studio produced, so
there would be no copyright issues with the existing statutes.223 The only barrier
for this possibility is that the onus is entirely on the studios to come forward and
release these copies for sale. Sony already began this sort of practice, though only
with 24 films.224 Another drawback with this option is that, because the edits are
already made, there is no flexibility as to what sort of content is removed. Modern
filtering companies like ClearPlay and VidAngel allow users to select content to
filter—a feature that would be unavailable with studio-produced edits.
A third and increasingly plausible possibility is for the courts or Congress to
vindicate VidAngel’s new service, and for it to increase in prevalence to the point
of widespread use. There are still some hurdles that remain for VidAngel to survive, but it continues to fight, and even in the course of researching and drafting
this article, the possibility of a future VidAngel service has increased.225 The two
biggest hurdles remaining are business contracts and legal authentication. It may
be that VidAngel winds up facing the same barriers that ClearPlay encountered:
technological hindrance through code alterations.226 While Netflix and Amazon
219. In re VidAngel, Inc., 593 B.R. 340, 353 (Bankr. D. Utah 2018) (lifting the stay on legal proceedings to allow the studios’ litigation to proceed).
220. See Harmon, supra note 134.
221. See About VidAngel, supra note 14; see also Dodson, supra note 13.
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. See Hughes, supra note 30; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
224. Hughes, supra note 30.
225. See Kayla Root, Why VidAngel May Still Win the Battle for Clean, Family-Friendly Filtering,
CBN NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/entertainment/2018/september/whyvidangel-may-still-win-the-battle-for-clean-family-friendly-filtering; see also Neal Harmon, Happy
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have not outright hindered or opposed VidAngel’s use of their platforms for its
service, neither company has endorsed nor openly supported VidAngel. 227 It is
entirely possible that either or both companies could take actions to block VidAngel’s efforts. This business aspect and the legal concerns may be helped by the
proposed amendments to the FMA.228 However, because this bill was introduced
so late in the legislative season, it was far from passage by the time the session
changed and the 116th Congress was sworn into office. Additionally, the bill’s
sponsor, Mia Love, lost a tight race for re-election that may have stopped the bill
in its tracks.229 Time alone will tell whether a new sponsor will pick up the FMA
amendments after this transition.
The fourth and final option is the most comprehensive, and possibly the most
difficult to bring about. If a new business were to arise that implemented this
fourth method, it would likely face no legal harm. VidAngel’s five primary offenses were: (1) illegal circumvention of TPMs, (2) unauthorized reproduction
and distribution of copyrighted works, (3) exceeding the scope of the first sale
doctrine, (4) preemptive release in restricted format/interruption of windowing
strategy, and (5) failure to filter authorized copies.230 If a new, technologicallyintegrated filtering service were created, it could resolve all five of these concerns.
Consider how a browser extension operates on an internet browser.231 It is not
a separate application, nor is it entirely its own program.232 It is an additional feature that becomes integrated into a browser.233 In like manner, if a filtering service
were to operate on a smart television or a background application (whether desktop or mobile), it could remove the current need for a separate app like VidAngel
currently uses. The interface would be the pure, currently available streaming
services with an editing option that overlays once a title is selected. As undesired
content arises, the extension (likely through some combination of filtering data
and artificial intelligence programming) would simply work as an automated remote—muting or skipping any frames the user chooses to omit.
Such a service would rectify all five of VidAngel’s mistakes. Because it
would operate over other streaming services, there would be no need to decrypt or
circumvent digital protections such as TPMs. In this extension-type form, the
filtering service would have no need to either reproduce or distribute the copyrighted works. Any questions of first sale or fair use would be moot, as the service
would not require any sort of purchase or rental of the copyrighted work. Whereas
VidAngel preemptively provided content in as-of-yet prohibited formats, this
extension would only stream from the authorized platforms, therefore not interfer-

227. Maddaus, supra note 192.
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ing with any windowing strategy the studios may have. Finally, any works edited
by such an extension would be from authorized, licensed copies.234
Additionally, programmers could tailor such a service to be applicable across
more platforms because it is an extension rather than an application. Whereas
VidAngel is now restricted to Amazon and Netflix, and ClearPlay is exclusively
on Google Play Movies, an extension could have functionality over multiple
streaming services.235 Users would have no need to acquire or obtain any specific
services; they could use the same platforms they already have and use every day.
Admittedly, this fourth option for the future of filtering may be difficult to
create. It would require an advanced level of programing and technological expertise. The artificial intelligence in question would need the ability to know exactly
when questionable content will arise within a stream. With that foreknowledge, it
could, regardless of which streaming platform is used, smoothly skip from the last
frame before the questionable content to the first frame after it. That level of expertise is difficult to come by. However, despite this difficulty, it seems that such
a model would fit most cleanly within the parameters of the FMA (amended or
current) while also providing a simple, accessible, and sustainable business model—the step ClearPlay struggled to do.236
One pattern discernable among the history of filtering is that the closer the filtering service is to the actual filtering, the more problems there tend to be. CleanFlicks edited and burned its discs directly.237 ClearPlay and VidAngel both tried to
place the actual filtering function within the home.238 The next logical step is to
place the filtering technology directly in the home while removing the filtering
company from the picture. Ideally, this means that this extension should be a
product rather than a service. The less involved the company is, the more the filtering is taking place in the hands and at the desires of the viewer. The FMA as
currently enacted allows for “the creation or provision of a computer program or
other technology that enables” filtering. 239 It seems that an actual program (or
extension) fits more cleanly within the statute than would a company like VidAngel. The ideal filtering system should be a “program or other technology” rather
than a service.240

VI. CONCLUSION
After two decades of trial, error, and downright failure, movie filtering companies are getting closer to finding the perfect mesh of business model and legal
propriety. CleanFlicks failed on both accounts; ClearPlay was legal, but ineffec234. Cf. VIDANGEL, supra note 196, at 2 (claiming that VidAngel’s new service streams from licensed copies. Legally, an extension like the one proposed would run similarly, but would have greater
versatility than VidAngel’s current platform restrictions.).
235. Cf. David Gernon, This Service Combines All of Your Streaming Services in One Place. Here’s
How it Works, CNBC (July 22, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/21/reelgoodcombines-all-of-your-streaming-services-heres-how-it-works.html (demonstrating that services already
exist that can function over multiple streaming services. Simply repurposing this type of programming
would be a great start to developing the proper software.).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005).
237. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (2006).
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tive as a business; VidAngel violated copyright, and its future is uncertain. Of the
existing models, VidAngel’s new service is closest to success, and time will tell if
it is refined enough, but the ideal filtering company has yet to lay claim to this
corner of the market. The future may see an already-existing company filling this
need, or it may see a new player altogether, but one thing is certain: there is still
work to do. There is a way to protect both the copyrights of the studios and the
preferences of the viewer, and as businesses get closer to striking that balance,
they continue chipping away at the unanswered questions in the fight for filtering.
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